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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
 
HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant, James William Riley ("Riley"), a Delaware death row inmate, appeals a 
final order of the United States District Court for the District of Delaware denying his 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Delaware sentenced Riley to death after a jury 
found him guilty of felony murder and recommended his execution.0  Riley also appeals 
several of the district court's interlocutory orders, including its denial of his motion 
for leave to amend his habeas petition.  We hold that the district court's denial of 
Riley's motion to amend his petition was inconsistent with the exercise of sound 
discretion.  Accordingly, we will reverse the district court's order denying Riley leave 
to amend his petition, vacate its order denying the original petition and remand for 
reconsideration of all the issues Riley seeks to raise in his proposed amended petition, 
including those issues the district court decided on the allegations in the unamended 
petition.0  
                     
0Delaware grades felony murder as murder in the first degree. See 11 Del.C. § 636(a)(2).  
Persons found guilty of felony murder are subject to capital punishment.  The fact that 
death occurred in the commission of a felony is one of the aggravating factors Delaware 
uses to narrow the class of persons who can be sentenced to death.  See Riley v. State
496 A.2d 997, 1021 (Del. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986). 
0The other interlocutory orders Riley appeals are:  (1) the district court's refusal to 
conduct an evidentiary hearing; (2) the district court's denial of his motions to conduct 
discovery and expand the record; and (3) the district court's denial of his applications 
for funds for a psychiatrist and private investigator.  Because of our disposition we do 
not consider the merits of these other interlocutory orders nor the merits of any of 
Riley's arguments concerning them, beyond his challenge to the district court's denial of 
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I. 
 After a five and one-half day trial, a jury convicted Riley of two counts of 
first degree murder (felony murder and intentional murder), second degree conspiracy, 
possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony and robbery in the first 
degree.  The convictions arose out of a liquor store robbery by Riley and co-defendants, 
Tyrone Baxter ("Baxter") and Michael Williams ("Williams").  During the robbery, the 
liquor store owner resisted and hit Riley with a bottle of wine.  Riley shot the owner 
twice, killing him.0 
 The State's case was largely based on Baxter's and Williams's testimony.0
the jury found Riley guilty, it heard evidence on whether he should be sentenced to death 
or life imprisonment.0  The jury unanimously recommended death, and the state trial court 
                                                                                          
his motion to amend. These other arguments are that: (1) the State's exercise of 
peremptory challenges violated the Equal Protection Clause; (2) his trial counsel's 
performance was ineffective; (3) the jury was biased in favor of the death penalty; 
(4) prejudicial statements were made to the jury on the finality of a death sentence; 
(5) the state court's proportionality review was unconstitutional; (6) the jury 
instructions created a substantial risk that the death penalty would be imposed in an 
arbitrary and capricious manner; (7) the district court erred by denying his motion to 
appoint co-counsel and an investigator; and (8) the state's use of felony murder to 
establish both eligibility for and imposition of the death penalty was unconstitutional. 
Accordingly, we express no opinion on the merits of these or any other issues raised by 
Riley, except to note with respect to issue number (8) that our opinion in Deputy v. 
Taylor, 19 F.3d 1485 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, sub. nom., Stanley v. Taylor, 114 S. Ct. 
2730 (1994), is binding on this panel.  Under the circumstances of this case, we believe 
the district court should consider all these issues in light of the amended petition, 
that a record can be developed in connection with its allegations. 
0For a more detailed discussion of the facts underlying Riley's convictions, see Riley v. 
Snyder, 840 F. Supp. 1012, 1017 (D. Del. 1993) and Riley v. State, 496 A.2d at 1001
0Plea bargains resulted in a life sentence for Baxter.  The charges against Williams were 
dropped. 
0Once a Delaware jury decides that any of the statutory aggravating circumstances are 
present it is free to consider any relevant circumstance in determining whether to 
sentence a capital defendant to life imprisonment or death.  See Whalen v. State, 492 A.2d 
552, 560 (Del. Sup. 1985); Flamer v. State, 490 A.2d 104, 121-23 (1984), cert. denied
U.S. 865 (1985).  
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sentenced Riley to be hung.0  It also sentenced Riley to life imprisonment without pa
for intentional murder, twenty years imprisonment for robbery, five years imprisonment for 
possession of a deadly weapon and three years imprisonment for conspiracy. 
 On direct appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Riley's conviction and his 
death sentence.  Riley v. State, 496 A.2d at 1027.  Riley then obtained new counsel, 
Lawrence Connell ("Connell"), and sought post-conviction relief in the Delaware Superior 
Court.  Riley raised multiple issues, including discriminatory use of peremptory 
challenges, ineffective assistance of counsel and inadequate voir dire.  After holding 
three evidentiary hearings on the ineffectiveness issue, the Superior Court denied Riley's 
motion for post-conviction relief. Riley moved for reargument.  In considering the 
reargument motion, the Superior Court held that Riley had established a prima facie
of racial discrimination in the state's use of peremptory challenges against prospective 
jurors.  See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).  It held an evidentiary hearing on 
the Batson issue, but ultimately decided it against Riley, and reaffirmed its denial of 
Riley's motion for post-conviction relief. 
 The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's denial of 
post-conviction relief.  Riley v. State, 585 A.2d 719, 730 (Del. 1990), cert. denied
U.S. 1223 (1991). It considered and rejected Riley's contentions that: (1) the jury 
instructions were inadequate at the penalty stage, id. at 722-25; (2) the Superior Court 
erred in applying Batson, id. at 725; (3) the voir dire was inadequate to identify jurors 
who would automatically impose the death penalty, id. at 725-26; and (4) trial counsel was 
ineffective at the penalty stage, id. at 726-30.  After the United States Supreme Court 
denied Riley's petition for a writ of certiorari, the Delaware Superior Court on July
1992 ordered that Riley be executed on August 15, 1991.  Three days before the 
                     
0Delaware has amended its law concerning capital punishment so that persons sentenced to 
death after June 13, 1986 are now executed by lethal injection.  See State v. Deputy
A.2d 411, 415-416 (Del. Sup. 1994) (discussing 11 Del.C. § 4209).  Those sentenced to 
death before that date can elect death by hanging or lethal injection.  Id.    
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scheduled execution, Riley filed a petition for habeas corpus in the United States 
District Court for the District of Delaware and sought an ancillary stay of execution.  
The district court granted a stay. 
 In October 1991, after he filed a brief on the issues the petition raised and 
the State responded, Riley moved for substitution of counsel.  He asked that Thomas
Allingham, III, ("Allingham") and Mary M. MaloneyHuss of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & 
Flom enter their appearance as lead counsel with Connell to continue as co-counsel.  At a 
hearing on the motion Connell explained that he lacked the time and resources to conduct 
an adequate investigation of Riley's claims.  The district court granted the motion and 
extended the filing date for Riley's reply brief, the only outstanding submission, to 
January 31, 1992.  The court also stated it anticipated an amended petition, advising 
Allingham that further extensions beyond January 31, 1992 would not be granted absent 
extreme circumstances.0  In response Allingham told the court that the January 31 date was 
suggested "virtually in the dark" after only three days of preparation, but that he would 
do everything possible to meet it. 
 On January 10, 1992 Riley sought leave to amend his petition and stay further 
briefing until an amended petition could be filed.  Appended to the motion was an 
affidavit describing the nature of the work completed, the number of hours spent to date 
in preparing the case (over 700 hours) and an estimate of time required to complete the 
investigation (an additional 750-800 hours).  The motion for leave to amend did not append 
the text of a proposed amended petition, but instead sought a six-month extension to 
                     
0The district court said: 
 
I think [the State] correctly judges this, that there's going to be an 
amended petition, probably.  I don't know whether it will be the 
mother of all petitions, but it will probably be real close.  And then 
I think we'll have joined for you two to fight out the issues in the 
case before me and then I think the case will move rather quickly. 
 
App. at 1010.   
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prepare one.  On February 25, 1992 the district court denied the motion for extension, 
stating that "the Court concludes that Petitioner essentially seeks time to establish a 
new case, which ultimately defies the purpose of federal habeas review."  Riley v. Taylor
No. 91-438-JJF, slip op. at 4 (D. Del. Feb. 25, 1992) (unpublished disposition) (citing 
McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1469-70 (1991) (successive habeas petitions subject to 
dismissal for abuse of the writ)). 
 On March 6, 1992 Riley moved for reconsideration.  This time he attached the 
amended petition he proposed to file.  The State did not oppose Riley's motion for 
reconsideration, but the district court denied it anyway.  It also denied three other 
motions filed on Riley's behalf:  one seeking expert psychiatric, psychological, and 
investigative assistance; another for an order directing the State to file copies of 
missing transcripts; and a third requesting leave to pursue discovery and expand the 
record. On December 20, 1993 the district court issued an opinion and final order denying 
Riley's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court concluded, "the state 
court record provides a sufficient basis to decide the merits."  Nevertheless it issued a 
certificate of probable cause and stayed Riley's execution pending disposition of this 
appeal. 
 
II. 
 The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over Riley's petition 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244 (West 1994).  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 1993) and 28 U.S.C.A. § 2253 (West 1994).  We review a district 
court's denial of a motion to amend a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as we do the 
denial of a motion to amend any civil complaint, for abuse of discretion.  See Gillette v. 
Tansy, 17 F.3d 308, 312 (11th Cir. 1994); Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1413 (3d Cir. 
1993); 28 U.S.C.A. § 2242 (West 1994) (An application for a writ of habeas corpus "may be 
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amended or supplemented as provided in the rules of procedure applicable to civil 
actions."). 
 
III. 
 Riley argues that the district court erred when it denied his request for leave 
to amend the petition.  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to motions to amend 
petitions for a writ of habeas corpus.  See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2242 (West 1994). The rules 
provide in relevant part: 
A party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of course at 
any time before a responsive pleading is served . . . . Otherwise a 
party may amend the party's pleading only by leave of court or by 
written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given 
when justice so requires. 
 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (emphasis added). 
 In Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181-82 (1962), the Supreme Court interpreted 
the phrase "freely-given" as a limit on a district court's discretion.  It stated, "`the 
Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by 
counsel may be decisive to the outcome and [that it] accept[ed] the principle that the 
purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.'"  Id. at 182 
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957)).  Thus, a refusal of a motion for leave 
to amend must be justified.  Id. Permissible justifications include: (1) undue delay; 
(2) bad faith or dilatory motive; (3) undue prejudice to the opposition; (4) repeated 
failures to correct deficiencies with previous amendments; and (5) futility of the 
amendment. Id.; see also Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1414 (3d Cir. 1993); Dole v. 
Arco Chemical Co., 921 F.2d 484, 487 (3d Cir. 1990); Averbach v. Rival Mfg. Co., 879 F.2d 
1196, 1203 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1023 (1990); Jablonski v. Pan American 
World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 292 (3d Cir. 1988); J.E. Mamiye & Sons, Inc. v. 
Fidelity Bank, 813 F.2d 610, 613 (3d Cir. 1987). 
10 
 The State argues primarily that Riley's motion for leave to amend was an abuse 
of the writ within the meaning of McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991), because Riley did 
not show "cause and prejudice" for his failure to include new claims in his earlier 
petition.  Brief of Appellee at 11 ("Following McCleskey, Riley's inability to excuse his 
failure to raise these claims in his first petition dooms him to failure on the 'cau
prong of the cause and prejudice test."); see also Wise v. Fulcomer, 958 F.2d 30, 34 (3rd 
Cir. 1992).  We disagree. 
 In McCleskey, the Supreme Court sought to curtail successive petitions for 
habeas corpus.  It reasoned that a petitioner "may abuse the writ of [habeas corpus] by 
failing to raise a claim through inexcusable neglect."  McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 489; 
also Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715, 1720 n.5 (1992).  After McCleskey, a 
meritorious claim first raised in a motion to amend could be lost forever if leave to 
amend is denied.  On the record now before us, we believe Riley's not insignificant risk 
of losing the opportunity to litigate the issues he raises in his proposed amended 
petition conflicts with the strong presumption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
favoring decisions on the merits.  See Fetterly v. Paskett, 997 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1993), 
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 290 (1994) (amendments to an initial petition for habeas corpus
should be liberally permitted in order to ensure a single comprehensive petition rather 
than successive petitions advancing new claims.).0  Riley merely seeks leave to amend his 
initial petition.  In McCleskey the Supreme Court was considering the practice of filing 
successive petitions.  See McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 479.  See also Foman, 371 U.S. at 181.
                     
0In Fetterly, a petitioner sentenced to death discovered previously unexhausted claims.  
To avoid the contention that he abused the writ, he sought a stay so that he could exhaust 
all his claims in state court before presenting them to the district court in a single 
comprehensive petition for habeas corpus. Fetterly, 997 F.2d at 1301-02.  The court of 
appeals held that the district court abused its discretion when it refused to stay the 
federal habeas proceedings to permit petitioner to exhaust his newly discovered claims in 
the state courts and thereafter amend his petition.  Id. 
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 The State also seeks to justify the district court's denial of Riley's motion 
for leave to file an amended petition on the ground of undue delay.  It states that 
Riley's "request, if granted, for a six month extension . . . would have constituted undue 
delay, because nearly one year would have passed between the filing of Riley's first 
petition and the extended filing date."  Brief of Appellee at 10.  We believe the passage 
of this interval fails to justify the denial of a motion for leave to amend a petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus.   
 We believe this interval, standing alone "is an insufficient ground upon which 
to deny a motion to amend."  Howze v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 750 F.2d 1208, 12
(3d Cir. 1984) (citing Cornell and Co. Inc. v. OSHRC, 573 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1978)).  The 
six month delay Riley initially sought, though substantial, is not so extremely long that 
in and of itself it justifies the refusal of an extension.  Riley's counsel explained that 
he needed additional time because of "incomplete state court records and the complexity of 
the case,"  Brief of Appellant at 16.  Moreover, it quickly became apparent that a much 
shorter extension would have met Riley's need when counsel attached the text of a proposed 
amended petition to the motion for reconsideration Riley filed one week later.  Thus, when 
the district court denied reconsideration, it was apparent that an order granting a 
reasonable extension beyond the initial January 31, 1992 deadline would not have resulted 
in undue delay. Of course, the district court's initial statement on October 18, 1991 that 
it would not look favorably upon requests for an extension of time beyond January 31, 1992 
cannot, in and of itself, justify refusal of Riley's request for an extension that is not 
undue, particularly where there is no claim that the extension actually needed will be 
prejudicial to the state. Otherwise a court's announcement of a deadline would, ipse
dixit, trump the policy behind Rule 15 and the principles of Foman.0  
                     
0The parties do not contend that bad faith or repeated failure to correct deficiencies are 
present here. 
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 Riley filed his original motion for an extension, in a timely fashion, three 
weeks before the January 31, 1992 deadline. He also acted quickly once the district court, 
denied the January 10, 1992 motion on February 25, 1992, after the court's January 
1992 deadline had passed.  Though Riley's counsel at oral argument conceded that he had no 
real expectation of getting the full six month extension he asked for, he also represented 
that an amended petition could have been filed by the January 31, 1992 deadline if the 
court had indicated, before the deadline expired, that it would not be extended.0 
 The district court's explained its initial denial of Riley's motion for leave to 
amend as follows: 
After a careful review of [Riley]'s application and considering the 
arguments of counsel, the Court concludes that [he] essentially seeks 
time to establish a new case, which ultimately defies the purposes of 
federal habeas review.  The Court is persuaded that the objective of 
making full and comprehensive presentation of the appropriate issues 
for review in this case does not necessitate the filing of an amended 
petition, and thus, the Court will deny [Riley]'s Motion for Leave to 
File an Amended Petition. 
 
 
Riley v. Taylor, No. 91-438, slip op. at 4 (D. Del. Feb. 25, 1992) (citations omitted).  
We disagree.  Riley's amended petition not only advances new arguments in support of his 
initial petition for a writ of habeas corpus, but it also raises two entirely new claims.  
They appear to be fully exhausted and not the subject of procedural default.  Though we 
cannot say Riley will prevail on any of them, we are equally unable to say the amendments 
he proposed are so unlikely to affect the outcome that they would be futile. 
 The first new claim is based on Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).  
In Witherspoon, the Supreme Court held that in capital cases the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments prohibit exclusion of jurors who have voiced "general objections to the death 
penalty" or "religious scruples against its infliction" for cause.  Id. at 522.  
Otherwise, according to the Supreme Court's reasoning, juries so selected would be 
                     
0This representation is supported by the attachment of the proposed amended petition to 
Riley's March 6, 1992 motion for reconsideration.    
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predisposed to impose the death penalty once they had found the defendant guilty of a 
capital crime.  The present record arguably shows that the state court that tried Riley's 
capital case arguably excluded two potential jurors for cause because of their antipathy 
to the death penalty, rather than a refusal to vote for capital punishment if death was 
justified by the law and the evidence.0   
 Riley's other new claim is based on Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) 
(criminal defendant has constitutional right to receive any evidence in the prosecution's 
possession which would tend to exculpate him).  In Brady, the Supreme Court concluded that 
"the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request 
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment."  
Id. This evidence consists of transcripts of telephone conversations between Baxter and 
Baxter's mother.  Riley alleges that Baxter spoke with her on numerous occasions between 
the time of arrest and trial.  He sought a transcript of the tape recordings of these 
calls for possible impeachment of Baxter, a key witness for the prosecution.  See United 
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (impeachment evidence within the Brady rule).  
The trial court, without performing an in camera review, denied Riley's request for these 
transcripts.0   
 An "[a]mendment of the complaint is futile if the amendment will not cure the 
deficiency in the original complaint or if the amended complaint cannot withstand a 
renewed motion to dismiss."  Jablonski v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 
292 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing Massarsky v. General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 125 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 937 (1983)).  We cannot say that is the case with Riley's proposed 
amendments. 
                     
0While we do not resolve this issue, we note that it was twice raised in the Delaware 
Supreme Court and rejected.  See Riley v. State, 585 A.2d at 725-26; Riley v. State
A.2d at 1002-06. 
0No court has yet reviewed these tapes, in camera or otherwise. Riley's Brady claim was
however, rejected by the Delaware Supreme Court.  See Riley v. State, supra, 496 A.2d at, 
1019. 
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 To summarize, Riley's proposed amended petition advances new claims that may 
have arguable merit, alleges additional support for the claims he made in the original 
petition, was not the subject of undue delay and, on this record, it does not appear that 
the short delay actually needed to prepare the amended petition would have prejudiced the 
state. Accordingly, we hold that the district court's order denying Riley leave to amend 
his petition for a writ of habeas corpus is inconsistent with the exercise of sound 
discretion in light of Rule 15(a)'s command that amendments should be freely allowed when 
justice so requires. 
 
IV. 
 The district court's order denying Riley's motion for leave to amend his 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus will be reversed and the case remanded to the 
district court to allow Riley to file an amended petition in the form attached to his 
March 6, 1992 motion for reconsideration and thereafter for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
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